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Abstract
We exploit a new data set of judicial rulings on motions in order to investigate the relationship 
between judicial ability and judicial outcomes. The data set consists of federal district judges’ 
rulings on motions to dismiss, to approve the lead plaintiff, and to approve attorneys’ fees in 
securities class actions cases, and also judges’ decisions to remove themselves from cases. We 
predict that higher-quality judges, as measured by citations, affirmance rates, and similar criteria, 
are more likely to dismiss cases, reject lead plaintiffs, reject attorneys’ fees, and retain cases 
rather than hand them over to other judges. Our results are mixed, providing some but limited 
evidence for the hypotheses. 
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1. Introduction 
An enormous literature has established that judges are sometimes influenced by 
their ideological preferences, but leaves unanswered many questions about judicial 
decisionmaking. One unanswered question concerns the relationship between the ability 
of judges and their judicial output. Everyone would agree that judges with greater judicial 
ability should produce higher-quality output—more decisions, better decisions, better 
opinions that describe their reasoning. But how does one measure the ability of judges? 
This question has received little attention from scholars. Yet it is of great importance. 
Confirmation battles typically are fought over two issues: the politics of the nominee, and 
the qualifications of the nominee. When district judges are nominated to the appellate 
bench, their performance as trial judges provides a basis for evaluating them. 
Nevertheless, there is rarely a serious inquiry into what objectively measureable aspects 
of the relative performances of the lower court judges or their prior backgrounds should 
be considered in determining the best candidates for promotion. 
By contrast, take the primary ratings of nominees that are employed, the 
subjective ratings produced by the American Bar Association. The American Bar 
Association’s evaluations of judicial nominees have been found to have but a limited 
relationship to future judicial performance, measured in terms of reversals and citations 
(Barondes 2009; Landes, et al., 1998, at 325). These ratings have also been criticized by 
conservatives who believe that they are politically biased (Vining, et al., 2009, discuss 
the debate and the empirical evidence). Further, there is evidence suggesting that judges 
who do better on citations and publications take longer to get confirmed (Lott 2005). In 
sum, there seems to be room for better predictive measures of judicial ability. 
Judicial ability has two sources: native talent and experience. Talent reflects sheer 
cognitive ability and the capacity for hard work. Experience reflects years on the job, first 
as a lawyer, and then as a judge. People with more experience as lawyers and judges 
should be better judges. Other personality characteristics no doubt play a role in the 
quality of judicial decisionmaking. Integrity is one such characteristic. People with 
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lifetime tenure may be tempted to shirk on the job; those with integrity will resist this 
temptation (at the margin). 
The hypothesis of this paper is that more able judges produce superior judicial 
output. This hypothesis might seem too obvious to be worth proving, but in fact it raises 
important and interesting issues. The first is the methodological challenge of finding 
measures for judicial ability and judicial performance. If we find positive correlations 
between the measures we propose, this provides some evidence that the measures are 
non-arbitrary. Another issue is the relative contribution of native talent and experience to 
judicial ability. If native talent (measured by attendance at a top law school) dominates 
experience (measured by years on the bench), that is useful information for those who 
seek to elevate high-quality trial judges to the appellate bench. 
The hypothesis that high-ability judges produce superior judicial output is also 
central to the design of the judicial system. Federal judges enjoy lifetime tenure and 
cannot be given bonuses for good work or penalties for bad work. Their incentives to 
work hard and well are accordingly weak. Some trial judges may hope that they might be 
awarded with elevation—appellate judges are paid more than trial judges.1 But the 
prospect of elevation is exceedingly remote, and depends on many factors outside the 
judge’s control—such as politics. In any other labor market, we would expect that 
workers who cannot be punished or rewarded would shirk on the job. It therefore should 
be an open question whether judges would do the same. 
If high-ability judges are those who can do the same work as low-ability judges 
with less effort, and if all judges seek prestige or the good opinion of the profession while 
also seeking to minimize effort, then high-ability judges should, at the margin, work 
harder than low-ability judges do. In effect, hard work is “cheaper” for high-ability 
judges than for low-ability judges. If judges are not affected by incentives, then high-
ability and low-ability judges should work equally hard (presumably just enough to avoid 
professional disgrace or impeachment). Thus, if we find evidence that high-ability judges 
produce superior judicial output, then we can infer that judges are affected by incentives, 
however weak they might seem to outsiders. 
Our data set consists of decisions of trial judges on motions in securities class 
actions. We focus on securities class actions for a number of reasons. They are typically 
characterized by two-sided agency problems (Choi 2003). That is, the real parties whose 
interests are at stake, the shareholders, frequently have little control over the litigation. 
Instead, the agents on one side, the corporate executives whose actions are being 
challenged, have an incentive to bury any problems and settle using the company’s funds. 
The agents on the other side, the plaintiffs’ lawyers, have an incentive to focus on 
obtaining the highest fees with as little effort as possible. The end result is that many of 
these cases result in high payouts for the plaintiff’s lawyers, low penalties for the 
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misbehaving executives, and high costs to the shareholders (Romano 1991; Bai, Cox & 
Thomas 2010; Choi 2003, surveys the literature). For our purposes, what is important 
here is that there is a central role for the judge in protecting the interests of the class of 
investors. The judge, who has to approve of any settlement that the executives and the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers make, has the power to reject the settlement and demand that greater 
attention be paid to the interests of investors. However, the incentives of the judge are not 
necessarily to act in such a fashion. Demanding that the parties redo the settlement will 
require higher effort from the judge, since she will have to give reasons and later assess 
the revised settlements. There is also the theoretical risk of a time-consuming trial 
(although the risk is close to zero). Given that it is the managers and plaintiffs’ lawyers 
who control the litigation, the judge who wishes to minimize work has an incentive to 
approve quickly whatever settlement is suggested. This setting is useful for our inquiry 
because it allows us to look at the behavior of judges in approving these settlements and 
draw conclusions as to whether they exerted effort to protect the interests of the absent 
parties or deferred to the interests of the lawyers controlling the litigation. 
Further, securities class actions have complex issues and multiple parties. In other 
words, effort and expertise on the part of the judges are likely to make a difference. On 
the flip side, these are also cases that the judges less inclined to expend effort might wish 
to avoid. Given that trial judges, particularly in the context of large multi-district class 
actions, have some discretion over which cases they take, we can examine whether 
judges choose to avoid these cases as a function of prior backgrounds (Baum 2010).  
Finally, the law on securities class actions, largely a function of the 1995 Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) was still relatively new and evolving during 
the period that we examine (cases decided from 2003 to mid-2007). That means that 
lawyers would not have as yet been able to collect enough information about how 
individual judges would behave so as to be able to fully adjust their litigation strategies to 
the likely behavior of the judges in these cases. 
We use a dataset of 615 federal district court judges and their judicial 
performance in 2001 and 2002 combined with a dataset of 552 securities class actions 
filed from 2003 to mid-2007. Unusually, our dataset of cases includes not just case 
outcomes, but judges’ decisions on various motions, including motions to dismiss, to 
approve settlements, and to approve attorneys’ fees. We find evidence that the general 
and business-specific ability of the judge is correlated with the propensity of a judge to 
make decisions in securities class actions that involve more work or risk more work in 
the future. But not all the evidence is consistent with our hypotheses, and the story it tells 
about judicial incentives, and particularly those of judges who have taken senior status, is 
complex. 
We survey related literature in Section 2 and set forth our hypotheses relating 
effort and expertise to judicial quality in securities class actions in Section 3. Section 4 
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describes our dataset and variables. Section 5 reports our empirical tests. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature 
The literature on the relationship between judicial ability and judicial output is 
sparse. Landes, Lessig and Solimine (1998) find that federal appeals court judges from 
elite schools and those with high honors produce more cited opinions (a proxy for 
quality). Christensen and Szmer (2009) find that more experienced federal appellate 
judges are slower at deciding cases (they attribute it to “burn-out”), and that graduates of 
elite law schools decide cases more quickly.2 Bhattacharya & Smyth (2001), using data 
on invocations (a type of citation where the judge is invoked by name), find that younger 
and more conservative judges tend to be more influential. Posner (1985), using citation 
and citation depreciation measures, suggests more of a life cycle model. His theory and 
data suggest that judges tend to improve as they age up to a certain point and then, 
presumably as age catches up, decline in performance. Taha (2004) finds that judges with 
higher ABA ratings and more experience publish more opinions. Choi, Gulati and Posner 
(2010), find that federal district judges who attended one of the top three law schools 
publish more opinions. In a study of the Japanese judiciary, Ramseyer (2010) finds that 
judges who attended elite law schools and performed well on an exam decided medical 
malpractice cases more quickly and in greater quantity. Together, these findings suggest 
judges with greater talent and experience—albeit up to the point when old age sets in—
tend to score better on measures of judicial performance.. 
There is some related work on specialization. Multiple commentators have argued 
that higher levels of specialization might be beneficial for judging in the more technical 
areas such as intellectual property, tax, bankruptcy and antitrust (Dreyfuss 1989; 
Dreyfuss 1995; Stempel 1995; Baum 2009, surveys the literature). Worthy (1971) 
provides data on reversal rates in tax cases for district judges and tax judges. He finds 
that the specialists do better. Nash and Pardo (2008) compare the rates of reversals and 
citation rates in bankruptcy cases for district judges and bankruptcy appellate panels. 
Again, the specialists do better. Scholars examining patent cases find that the Federal 
Circuit reverses district court decisions at a relatively high rate, as compared to the other 
appeals courts, suggesting that the generalist trial judges do not do well in tackling cases 
in this area (Moore 2001; Chu 2001; Wagner 2004).3 The one study examining the 
relative performances of generalist judges as a function of expertise is Baye and Wright 
(2009). Baye and Wright look at reversal rates in federal antitrust cases as a function of 
whether the judges attended a specialized economics training course for judges. Judges 
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with the training have higher affirmance rates in antitrust cases.4.A related debate 
concerns the dominance of Delaware in the field of corporate law. Some scholars argue 
that the dominance of Delaware in corporate law is a function of the high quality of 
judges on that court, particularly in terms of the strong business law backgrounds that 
they bring to the courts and the fact that they regularly see and decide important business 
law cases (Romano 1985). Others, however, take the view that Delaware dominates in 
corporate law not because it has the best courts, but because it caters (at least in part) to 
the narrow self-interest of corporate executives leading to a race-to-the-bottom (Bebchuk 
1992).  
Using data from a series of experiments on judges, Guthrie, Rachlinski and 
Wistrich (2006; 2009) ask whether specialist judges (bankruptcy and administrative law 
judges) are more likely to use deliberative processing of information rather than intuitive 
processing. The latter type of processing, while having some advantages, can result in 
faulty reasoning overall. Overall, the authors did not find strong differences in the 
information processing methods used (intuitive processing dominated). 
To summarize, there is some evidence that effort and expertise influence the 
quality of the judicial product. But the overall picture from the bits and pieces in the 
various studies is murky.  
 
3. Hypotheses 
We hypothesize that higher-ability judges produce higher-quality judicial 
output—in terms of quantity and quality. The challenge lies in measuring ability and 
quality. 
3.1 Measures of Judicial Ability 
We look at several measures of judicial ability. We look at three variables that 
measure the overall quality of judicial performance, which, we believe, provide a rough 
measure of ability. These variables are publication rate (number of opinions published 
divided by number of cases), affirmance rate (number of cases affirmed divided by 
number of cases), and positive outside citations (average number of per-case positive 
citations by out-of-jurisdiction courts)..We assume that judges who publish more, are 
affirmed more often, and produce opinions that receive more positive citations are judges 
with higher ability. The data come from cases decided in 2001–2, prior to the securities 
class action motions data that are used for the dependent variable (2003–7). They also 
reflect all cases decided, not just securities class actions. 
We also look at enrollment at a top law school (Harvard, Yale, Stanford) and 
years on the bench—standard measures of talent and experience, respectively. A third—
senior status—also (perhaps) suggests a judge who prefers to work less, reflecting less 
ability or energy. 
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Next, we look at two variables that reflect specialization—years in private 
practice and number of business cases. Private practice typically involves corporate law 
or litigation, often securities litigation; for that reason, we predict that judges with such 
experience will have higher ability for securities cases. Similarly, judges who already 
have a lot of business cases will have higher ability for securities cases. 
Finally, we have a variable for whether a judge is a Democrat. We do not assume 
that Democrats are more or less competent than other judges, but one might predict that 
Democrats would be more favorable to plaintiff’s lawyers, who are traditional supporters 
of the Democratic party, and to lead plaintiffs, who are likely to be ordinary people cast 
as victims of corporate greed. Thus, we use the party of the judge as a control variable, 
rather than as a measure of judicial ability.
3.2. Measures of Judicial Performance 
We use several measures of judicial performance that exploit our dataset of 
securities class action motions. 
Taking a securities case. Securities class actions are frequently difficult, involving 
multiple sophisticated parties, numerous lawyers, and difficult issues of causation, 
materiality and scienter. Not only is the regulatory apparatus complicated, but so are the 
underlying theories of market behavior. To add to the judge’s woes, there is considerable 
confusion about the precise standards coming out of the most recent statute dealing with 
these cases, the PSLRA. We predict that judges with high general ability or high 
specialized ability will be able to handle these cases more easily, and thus will be more 
likely to take on these cases in the first place. We also test the hypothesis that the high-
ability judges will be less likely to step down from a securities case once it begins. 
To be sure, judges do not formally have the power to choose to hear or not hear 
certain cases. However, they have several informal instruments for controlling their 
docket. First, judges have considerable discretion over whether to recuse themselves from 
cases for reasons of perceived conflicts of interest. Assuming the judge holds a 
diversified portfolio of stocks or has had an extensive past practice, it is likely that she 
will be able to recuse herself from many securities cases if she wishes to do so. These 
recusals could be on the grounds of either ownership of stock, past work for one of the 
parties or ties to someone who has an interest in the company at issue.5 Second, most 
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securities class actions are the product of multiple cases with an overlap in parties, 
claims, and factual background. The process of consolidating cases and choosing which 
judge to hear the consolidated case may allow for some discretion over assignment. 
Third, some courts, by local rule or custom, permit the chief judge to assign cases non-
randomly.6 If a big securities class action case comes in, the chief judge may assign the 
case to a judge with special expertise in these cases.7.Fourth, some courts may have 
procedures for funneling “related” cases to the same judge, in the interest of efficiency. 
These procedures might allow the judges room to assign certain types of cases to the 
specialists among them.8 Fifth, judges may have some leeway in deciding which cases to 
remove from their dockets and transfer to judges newly appointed to the court.9 The new 
judge will typically be assigned a set of cases from the assignment sheets for the other 
judges. Even assuming that the assignment procedure is random (e.g., every fourth case 
gets assigned to the freshman judge), the other judges may, depending on local practice, 
have room to say that they would like to hold on to particular cases.10 Sixth, judges who 
take senior status may be able to have their cases assigned to other judges.11 In sum, 
although judges are not supposed to have discretion over which cases they hear, it is 
likely such discretion does exist informally.12. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972). However, on the other side of the equation, there is the obligation to 
avoid the appearance of impropriety. 
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in Roe v. Wade to Justice Blackmun). Wahlbeck (2006). We suspect, however, that such dynamics do not 
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7 For a broader discussion of these informal mechanisms of specialization on the federal trial courts, see 
Baum (2010, chapter 1). Specialization by subject area also appears to occur on the federal appeals courts. 
Cheng (2009).  
8 For example, see the rules of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, districts that see a high 
volume of securities cases. Rules 15 & 1.6, Local Rules of the Southern and Eastern District of New York 
(1997; With Amendments through 2009) (hereinafter “Local Rules”).. 
9 E.g., Rule 12 of the Local Rules (explaining the system of assigning cases to new judges by lot, but also 
noting that “[n]o case shall be transferred without the consent of the transferor judge”).  
10 This possibility was suggested to us by a former federal district judge. 
11 E.g., Rule 17 of the Local Rules (noting that “ [w]hen an active judge becomes a senior judge, or later as 
the judge chooses, the judge may keep as much of his or her existing docket as said judge desires and 
furnish the assignment committee with a list of all cases which the judge desires to have transferred.”).  
12 For a period of time prior to that covered by our dataset, chief judges on the district court had the 
authority to reassign complex cases to particular judges (this was the 1971 Bar Harbor Resolution). This 
resolution, however, was rescinded in 1999 on the grounds that it allowed undue specialization and was 
inconsistent with “judicial autonomy”. Cheng (2007) (citing Committee on Court Administration and Case 
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Rejection of the lead plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel. In a securities class 
action, a court-appointed lead plaintiff acts on behalf of the rest of the investor class 
members. The PSLRA creates a presumption that the plaintiff with the greatest financial 
stake in the litigation (typically the party with the greatest damages), among other 
criteria, will be appointed lead plaintiff.13 Congress intended the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff 
provision to put in place a motivated lead plaintiff to protect the interests of investor class 
members against possible agency problems with the plaintiffs’ attorneys.  
At the stage in a securities class action when the lead plaintiff is selected, judges 
make two decisions. First, the judge decides on the motion for lead plaintiff. Second, the 
judge decides on the lead plaintiffs’ motion for lead counsel (often co-lead counsel). We 
do not focus on the first decision on the lead plaintiff itself because, in many cases, the 
judge does not have a decision to make. Where there is only one movant for lead 
plaintiff, the judge will select the sole movant. Even if multiple motions are made for 
lead plaintiff, as Choi (2009) reports, movants will often voluntarily withdraw their 
motions leaving just one movant (or combine together to form one grouped motion for 
lead plaintiff). We focus instead on the second judicial decision to approve the lead 
plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel—a decision a judge will have to make in all cases 
after the selection of the lead plaintiffs. 
In practice, plaintiffs’ attorneys come tied to a specific lead plaintiff movant at the 
lead plaintiff selection stage. Once the court appoints a specific movant for the lead, in 
theory the movant is allowed to select any plaintiffs’ attorney of their choice. However, 
courts often appoint the plaintiffs’ attorney who initially filed the motion for lead plaintiff 
as the lead counsel (Choi 2009). If multiple movants are appointed together as a group of 
lead plaintiffs, courts will often appoint the individual attorneys for each movant as co-
lead counsel without regard to the need for multiple attorney firms on the same case 
(Choi 2009). In effect, judges often appear to rubber stamp the selection of lead counsel 
by the lead plaintiff despite the specter of attorney agency cost problems. The reason for 
this may be that it is easier for the judge to do what the lawyers in front of the judge ask 
for (typically with no party opposing the lead plaintiff’s selection of lead counsel); going 
out of the way to act as an advocate for the absent investor is likely to annoy the lawyers 
and delay the resolution of the litigation.14. 
Accordingly, we predict that higher-ability judges will be more likely to reject the 
lead plaintiff’s selection of attorney.  
Dismissal with prejudice..Defendants move for dismissal of the case. Denials of 
such motions cannot be appealed because they are not final orders, but grants of the 
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motion can be appealed. In addition, because the grant of the motion ends the case at an 
early stage and under a rigorous set of conditions (the judge is ruling that, assuming all 
the properly alleged facts to be true, the plaintiffs still lose), judges are generally 
expected to explain their reasons. Finally, when cases are not dismissed, the parties are 
likely to settle (as opposed to going to trial), which is less work for the judge. For these 
reasons, granting a motion to dismiss entails more work, at least in the short term. We 
therefore predict that higher-ability judges will grant more motions to dismiss, all other 
things being equal (including in particular the strength of the case). 
Rejection of attorneys’ fees. The greatest point of conflict between plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and the plaintiff class is the attorney fee award. With passive members of a 
plaintiff class, plaintiffs’ attorneys may use their control to request a greater attorney fee. 
The greater the award, the lower the recovery available from the settlement fund. 
Meanwhile, the defendant has an incentive to collude with plaintiff’s lawyers in order to 
make the case go away. We therefore conjecture that higher-ability judges will be more 
likely to reject the lead counsel’s attorney fee motion.  
 
 3.3 Summary 
 We predict that high-ability judges—those with both high general ability and high 
specialized ability relating to business cases—are likely to produce higher-quality output. 
General ability is measured by attendance at a top school, years of judicial experience, 
non-senior status, publication rate, affirmance rate, and outside citation rate. Specialized 
ability is measured by private practice experience and number of business cases. High-
quality output means willingness to take the more difficult path in securities class 
actions—accepting a case, rejecting the lead plaintiff, dismissing the case, and rejecting 
proposed attorneys’ fees. 
 
4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1. Sample 
To test our hypotheses, we use two samples: a securities class action case dataset 
and a judge dataset. Our securities data consists of class actions involving a Rule 10b-5 
cause of action filed from 2003 to mid-2007 used in Choi (2009) and Choi and Pritchard 
(2010) obtained from the Stanford Securities Clearinghouse.15 We exclude cases in which 
financial firms (SIC 6000 to 6999) are the primary defendant because of the different 
regulatory regime that applies to them.  
[Insert Table 1 about Here]. 
 Table 1 shows that the lawsuit filings were distributed relatively equally across 
our sample period except for 2006 where there is a decline in class action filings. 
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Relatively few of our class actions were filed in 2007 due to the ending point of the 
dataset on June 21, 2007. Looking at the frequency of lawsuit by circuit, we find that 
most class action filings are in the Second and Ninth Circuits with 18.7% and 26.1% of 
the lawsuits. Almost half (49.9%) of the class actions resulted in settlement. A large 
percentage (37.5%) resulted in dismissal. 
Our judge dataset consists of all district judges active in either 2001 or 2002. We 
selected the judge dataset time period to allow us to collect information on the judge’s 
judicial output prior to class action filings in our securities class action dataset. As 
reported in Table 1, we had a total of 615 judges.16 Of these 615 judges active in 2001 
and 2002, only 201 (or 32.7%) were involved in a securities class action in our dataset. 
4.2. Variables 
We use two sets of independent variables in our regression tests. The first set of 
independent variables focus on a number of district judge level characteristics relating to 
ability.  
We define a number of variables relating to a judge’s overall judicial performance 
in the 2001 to 2002 period (immediately prior to our securities class action period from 
2003 to mid-2007). Publications Per Filings represents the average number of published 
opinions per district court filings per judge for the 2001 to 2002 period. Next, we 
calculate the average number of opinions that were affirmed at the circuit court level for 
the particular district court judge for the 2001 to 2002 time period (Affirmed Opinions).17 
The variable, Positive Citations, is the average number of positive citations per opinion 
for the judge in question during the 2001 to 2002 period. These are citations to a judge’s 
opinions from courts outside the circuit in which the judge sits. Judges who write more 
influential opinions, just like judges who produce more opinions, might be those with 
greater ability. 
Our overall judicial performance variables are subject to an endogeneity problem. 
A judge who incurs effort in order to publish opinions, write opinions that are affirmed, 
or write highly cited opinions, may have less time to tackle difficult motions in securities 
litigation. However, we assume that these variables are independent for two reasons. The 
three independent variables come from an earlier time period (2001–2), and refer to the 
mass of cases that judges hear, not just the securities cases. Thus, they are more plausibly 
an overall measure of judicial ability. 
We define Top School as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge went to 
Harvard, Yale, or Stanford law school and 0 otherwise. Top School acts as a crude 
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17 As the denominator in calculating this variable, we use the number of published opinions for the year .as 
the number of opinions that were likely appeal-worthy. Hoffman, et al. (2008) demonstrate that the 
decision of a judge to provide a written explanation of her reasons for a decision is tied to the likelihood of 
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 

indicator of initial legal ability for the judges. We also define an indicator variable for 
whether the judge has senior status. For our test of whether a judge ever presides over a 
securities class action decision in our class action sample period, we define Senior2005 as 
equal to 1 if the judge is a senior judge in 2005 or earlier and 0 otherwise. We choose 
2005 as the mid-point in our class action dataset that ranges from 2003 to mid-2007. For 
our tests of individual class action decisions, we define Senior as equal to 1 if the judge is 
a senior judge in the year of the specific motion decision in question (e.g., a decision to 
appoint lead counsel) and 0 otherwise.  
General judicial experience may also affect the ability of judges ruling on 
securities class action motion decisions. We define Prior Judge as an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the judge’s immediate occupation prior to becoming a federal district judge 
was as a judge, including state judges and federal magistrate judges, and 0 otherwise. We 
also compute the amount of experience each judge has as a federal district judge. For our 
test of whether a judge ever presides over a securities class action decision in our class 
action sample period, we define Judge Experience2002 as the difference between 2002 
and the year the judge was appointed to the district court. For our tests of individual class 
action decisions, we define Judge Experience as the difference between the year of the 
specific decision in question and the year the judge was appointed to the district court. 
We also include variables relating to the business specialization of a judge. To 
capture the business experience of a judge, we compute a variable for the fraction of 
published opinions that involved a securities law or other federal business law subject 
matter in the 2001 to 2002 time period (Business Caseload). Judges with a larger prior 
business caseload may have developed an expertise that allows them to make decisions in 
securities class actions that better protect the interests of investor class members. We also 
define Prior Private Practice as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge’s immediate 
occupation prior to becoming a federal district judge was as an attorney in private 
practice, and 0 otherwise.  
We define an indicator variable for whether the judge was appointed by a 
Democrat President (Democrat). Lastly, we define an indicator variable for whether the 
judge was a chief judge at any point during the 2003 to 2007 time period (Chief Judge, 
2003–7). The additional administrative burdens of a chief judge may reduce their 
likelihood of presiding over a securities class action and decrease the willingness of the 
chief judge to exert effort. Table 2 displays summary statistics. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about Here]. 
 

Securities Judgei =  + ß1iPublications Per Filingi  
+ ß2iAffirmed Opinionsi + ß3iPositive Citationsi 
+ ß4iTop Schooli.+ ß5iSenior2005i 
+ ß6iPrior Judgei.+ ß7iJudge Experience2002i 
+ ß8iDemocrati + ß9iChief Judge2003-2007i  
+ District Court Indicators  
+ Active Service Indicators + i 
 
We present the results in Table 3 as Model 1. We do not find evidence that 
judicial opinion quality (Positive Citations) or judicial inclination towards effort 
(Publications Per Filing) are associated with a higher propensity to preside over a 
securities class action. By contrast, we do find evidence that senior or close-to-senior-
status judges are less willing to preside over securities class actions. The coefficient on 
Senior2005 is negative and significant at the 5% level. This finding supports the 
assumption that senior judges have some control over the types of cases they take and 
may seek to avoid certain burdensome categories of cases. General judicial experience 
also is an important explanatory variable. The coefficient on Prior Judge is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on Judge Experience2002 is positive and 
significant at the 10% level. Those judges with prior judicial experience or greater 
experience on the federal bench are more likely to preside over a securities class action. 
Contrary to our expectation, however, the coefficient on Affirmed Opinions is negative 
and significant at the 10% level, indicating that high-ability judges (we assumed that one 
indicator of a higher judicial ability was a higher affirmance rate) avoid securities class 
actions. 
[Table 3 about Here] 
We next focus on whether judges with prior business law experience are more 
likely to preside over securities class actions—in other words whether district court 
judges informally specialize in taking class action cases. We re-estimate Model 1 with the 
addition of a variable for the fraction of published opinions that involved either a 
securities law or other federal business law subject matter in the 2001 to 2002 time period 
(Business Caseload). We also include an indicator variable for whether the judge’s 
immediate occupation prior to becoming a federal district judge was as an attorney in 
private practice (Prior Private Practice). We exclude our general judicial experience 
variables (Prior Judge and Judge Experience 2002).  
We report the results as Model 2 in Table 3. Neither Business Caseload nor Prior 
Private Practice are significantly different from zero. We find no evidence that judges 
with business law experience have a greater likelihood of presiding over a securities class 
action. As in Model 1, the coefficient on Senior2005 is negative but now significant at 
the 10% level. Judges who are senior or about to become senior judges are less likely to 
 

preside over class actions. Like in Model 1, the coefficient on Affirmed Opinions is 
negative and but it is now insignificant.18  
Our tests above compare judges who presided over securities class actions with 
judges who did not preside over such class actions. As another test of what factors 
determine whether federal district court judges choose to preside over securities class 
actions, we examine whether the first judge listed on the docket for a federal securities 
class action is the same judge the eventually makes the lead plaintiff motion decision. We 
predict that lower-ability judges are more likely to drop out of securities class actions.19 
We construct an indicator variable, Judge Continues, equal to 1 if the first judge listed in 
the docket of the reference complaint listed in Stanford’s Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse database (the consolidated complaint in the case of multiple filings) is the 
same judge that makes the lead plaintiff motion decision and 0 if the two are the 
different. We control for various factors that may affect a judge’s decision to approve the 
lead plaintiffs’ choice of lead counsel with a multivariate logit model using Judge Change 
as the dependent variable estimated on case level data. The model excludes cases where 
the reference complaint case shifted to another court before the lead plaintiff motion 
decision. The model also excludes cases where the first judge no longer was actively 
presiding over cases (due to death for example) by the time of the lead plaintiff motion 
decision. 
The right hand side of the equation is the same, with several exceptions. Instead 
of Judge Experience2002, we include Judge Experience defined as the years between the 
year of the first securities class action filing and the appointment year for the specific 
district judge. Instead of Senior 2005, we include Senior, defined as 1 if the judge is a 
senior judge in the year of the first securities class action filing and 0 otherwise. Lastly, 
instead of Chief Judge 2002–7 we include Chief Judge, defined as 1 if the judge is the 
Chief Judge in the year of the first securities class action filing and 0 otherwise. Because 
we use case level data and not pooled judge level data, we omit the Active Service 
                                                 
18 As a robustness test, we combine Prior Judge, Judge Experience2002, Business Caseload, and Prior 
Private Practice together with our other independent variables in the same model. Unreported, we obtain 
similar qualitative results as in the models of Table 3. As in Model 1 of Table 3, the coefficient on 
Affirmed Opinions is negative and significant at the 10% level.  
 To gauge the intensity of judge participation with securities class actions, we replace the binary 
Securities Judge dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 with the number of class action suits from 2003 to 
mid-2007 over which a particular judge presided (measured as of the time of the lead plaintiff decision). 
Unreported, we find similar qualitative results with the following differences. The coefficient on Chief 
Judge2002-2007 is negative and now significant at the 5% level in Model 1. This supports the view that 
Chief Judges, perhaps because of their increased administrative burden, are less likely to preside over 
securities class actions. The coefficient on Senior2005 in Model 2, while still negative, is now significant at 
only the 11.1% level. 
19 We corrected these dropout numbers for the possibility of deaths and retirements (there were only two 
such events). It is not clear from the docket sheets or other available documents, however, what the specific 
reasons for the dropouts were. One explanation for the dropout numbers has to do with the entrance of new 
judges to the court. As discussed earlier, when new judges join the court, a fraction of cases from the other 
judges is taken and given to the new judge. And the other judges typically have some discretion is saying 
that they would like to retain certain of those cases.. 
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Indicators. We also have no reason to believe that the propensity of a judge to continue 
with a particular class action varied with time in our dataset; accordingly, we do not 
include year effects for our case-level data. 
 
Judge Continuesi =  + ß1iPublications Per Filingi  
+ ß2iAffirmed Opinionsi + ß3iPositive Citationsi 
+ ß4iTop Schooli.+ ß5iSeniori 
+ ß6iPrior Judgei.+ ß7iJudge Experiencei 
+ ß8iDemocrati + ß9iChief Judgei  
+ Case Controls + District Court Indicators + i 
 
We present the results in Table 4 as Model 1. As with Table 3, we do not find 
evidence that Publications Per Filing is associated with a lower propensity to remove 
oneself from a securities case. By contrast, we do find evidence that senior judges are less 
willing to preside over securities class actions. The coefficient on Senior is negative and 
significant at the 5% level..This is consistent with our hypothesis that lower-ability 
judges– as we assume is correlated with senior status—are more likely to drop out as 
judge of a securities class action. We find no evidence that judges with a high affirmed 
case ratio are more willing to stick with securities class actions. Indeed, as in Table 3, the 
coefficient is on Affirmed Opinions is negative..  
In Model 2 of Table 4 we include our business-specific measures for experience 
(Business Caseload and Prior Private Practice) and remove our general judicial 
experience variables (Prior Judge and Judge Experience). Unlike the models of Table 3 
(which examined whether the judge presided over at least one securities class action over 
the 2003 to mid-2007 time period), we find that the coefficient on Business Caseload is 
positive and significant at the 10% level in Model 2 of Table 4. This supports the 
hypothesis that judges with a greater prior business caseload are more likely to retain 
jurisdiction over a securities class action.20  
In sum, we find mixed evidence on the importance of ability in the selection of 
judges who preside over securities class actions. Senior judges appear to avoid presiding 
over securities class actions. They are less likely to take these cases and, when they do 
                                                 
20 As a robustness test, we combine Prior Judge, Judge Experience2002, Business Caseload, and Prior 
Private Practice together with our other independent variables in the same model. Unreported, we obtain 
similar qualitative results as in the models of Table 4 with two differences. The coefficient on Publications 
Per Case is positive and now significant at the 10.3% level, indicating that hard working judges are less 
likely to drop out as judge of a securities class action, consistent with our hypothesis. The coefficient on 
Prior Private Practice is positive and significant at the 10% level. Contrary to our finding for Business 
Caseload (which remains negative and significant at the 10% level), judges with prior private practice 
experience are more likely to drop our as judge. Perhaps judges with prior private practice experience seek 
different type of work once they become federal judges. 
We add year effects to the models of Table 4. We obtain similar qualitative results as in Table 4 
with the following difference. The coefficient on Publications Per Case is negative and now significant at 
the 10% level in Model 1. Hard working judges are less likely to drop out as judge of a securities class 
action, consistent with our hypotheses.  
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take them, are more likely to drop off them. Judges with greater prior business caseload 
are no more likely to preside over a securities class action than other judges, although 
judges with greater general judicial experience are more likely to preside over such 
actions. In contrast, judges with a greater prior business caseload are more likely to stick 
with a securities class action once they are appointed the initial first judge. Contrary to 
our prediction, we also find (weak) evidence that one of our measures of judging 
ability—low rate of reversal—is negatively correlated with the probability of presiding 
over a securities class action. 
.  
5.2. Approval of Lead Plaintiff Attorney Selection
We predict that higher-ability judges will be more likely to reject the lead 
plaintiff’s selection of lead counsel than are lower-ability judges. To test this hypothesis, 
we construct an indicator variable, Lead Plaintiff Attorney Choice, defined as equal to 1 
if the judge rejected the lead plaintiffs’ choice of lead counsel without modification and 0 
otherwise.21 We estimate a multivariate logit model using Lead Plaintiff Attorney Choice 
as the dependent variable on case level data.  
We include case-level judge characteristic in the model as various factors that 
may affect a judge’s decision to approve the lead plaintiffs’ choice of lead counsel (the 
same as those in Model 1 of Table 4). We also include the case controls and the fraction 
of lead plaintiffs in the specific case in question that consist of public pension funds 
(Public Pension), labor union pension funds (Labor Union) and other institutions (Other 
Institution). Judges may be more receptive to the lead counsel choice of an institutional 
lead plaintiff compared with an individual lead plaintiff..We do not include Circuit or 
District effects in the model. We have no a priori reason to believe that circuit or district 
court-specific practices may affect a judge’s propensity to accept the lead plaintiffs’ 
selection of lead counsel. We also have no reason to believe that the propensity of a judge 
to accept or reject the lead plaintiffs’ choice of lead counsel varied with time and do not 
include year effects. 
 
Lead Plaintiff Attorney Choicei =  + ß1iPublications Per Filingi  
+ ß2iAffirmed Opinionsi + ß3iPositive Citationsi 
+ ß4iTop Schooli.+ ß5iSeniori 
+ ß6iPrior Judgei.+ ß7iJudge Experiencei 
+ ß8iDemocrati + ß9iChief Judgei  
+ ß10iPublic Pensioni + ß11iLabor Unioni  
+ ß12iOther Institutioni + Case Controls + i 
 
We present the results in Table 5 as Model 1. Here, contrary to our hypothesis 
that taking senior status was a sign of diminishing ability, senior judges appear more 
                                                 
21 Note that this variable is different from the Securities Judge variable, which was 1 if the judge made any 
type of decision regarding the plaintiff’s choice of lead counsel (both approval and rejection). 
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likely to reject the lead plaintiffs’ choice of lead counsel. The coefficient on Senior is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. Consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficient on 
Judge Experience is positive and significant at the 10% level. The other variables are not 
statistically significant. Again, like in the prior two tables, the coefficient on Affirmed 
Opinions (although not significant) points in a different direction from what we 
predicted.  
[Table 5 about Here] 
In Model 2 of Table 5 we include our business-specific measures for experience 
(Business Caseload and Prior Private Practice) and remove our general judicial 
experience variables (Prior Judge and Judge Experience). In Model 2, the coefficient on 
Publications Per Filing is positive and now significant at the 10% level. Higher-ability 
judges are more likely to reject the lead plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel without 
modification, consistent with our hypothesis. The coefficient on Business Caseload is 
positive and significant at the 10% level respectively. Judges with greater business 
expertise are also more likely to reject the lead plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel 
without modification. Contrary to our hypothesis regarding senior judges, the coefficient 
on Senior remains positive and significant (this time, at the 1% level), suggesting a 
willingness to exert high scrutiny on the part of the senior judges.22 
Endogeneity is a potential issue with our examination of the judicial decision 
whether to accept the lead plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel. Prospective plaintiffs’ 
lawyers might rationally anticipate a judge’s ability and adjust their actions at the stage in 
a class action when the lead counsel firms are selected. Where the judge has lower 
ability, prospective plaintiffs’ attorneys may put forth an application for lead counsel that 
is less likely to benefit the class and more likely to benefit solely the plaintiffs’ attorneys. 
One can imagine, for example, plaintiffs’ attorneys agreeing to divide up class actions, 
directing lower quality attorneys to low quality judges (who will be more likely to accept 
such attorneys) and leaving higher quality attorneys for the high quality judges. 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys may also aggregate previously separate motions for lead plaintiffs 
and join together as co-lead counsel to eliminate the risk of not getting selected as lead 
counsel and to diversify the risk of not achieving a profitable settlement from the 
litigation (Choi (2009)). 
The possibility of endogeneity in the motion for lead counsel will bias against 
finding a correlation between judges with high ability characteristics and a higher 
                                                 
22 As a robustness test, we combine Prior Judge, Judge Experience2002, Business Caseload, and Prior 
Private Practice together with our other independent variables in the same model. Unreported, we obtain 
similar qualitative results as in the models of Table 5 with the following differences. The coefficient on 
Publications Per Case is positive and now significant at the 5% level, indicating that hard working judges 
are less likely to accept the lead plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel. The coefficient on Prior Judge is 
positive and significant at the 10% level and the coefficient Prior Private Practice is positive and significant 
at the 5% level. Judges with greater judicial and business experience prior to becoming a federal judge are 
also less likely to accept the lead plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel. We also add year effects to the 
models of Table 5. We obtain similar qualitative results as in Table 5. 
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likelihood of rejecting the lead counsel motion. If lawyers perfectly anticipate judges’ 
ability, then lead counsel motions should never be rejected. Our results—which 
demonstrate a correlation between certain judge characteristics and the rejection of the 
lead counsel motion—are thus of even greater significance. We also are unsure of the 
magnitude of the possible endogeneity. As noted at the outset, we shaped our inquiry to 
cover a period of time when the law on securities class actions was in considerable flux, 
which should have made predictions about what judges would do more difficult from the 
perspective of plaintiffs’ attorneys. To assess the impact of endogeneity, we need a proxy 
for the “quality” of the lead counsel motion. For our proxy, we use the number of lead 
plaintiffs in the lead plaintiff group. A large number of lead plaintiffs—with a 
correspondingly larger collective action problem among the lead plaintiffs—indicates a 
greater likelihood that the plaintiffs’ attorneys have de facto control and that the judge 
should pay greater attention to the motion for lead counsel. Plaintiffs’ attorneys, for 
example, who know the judge will not in fact engage in close scrutiny of the lead counsel 
motion will be more likely to combine with other plaintiffs’ attorneys (or alternatively, 
find more lead plaintiffs on their own) to generate both a large group of proposed lead 
plaintiffs and co-lead counsel. 
We first compared the number of lead plaintiffs using a series of t-tests for our 
judge characteristics independent variables—separating the lead plaintiff judges into two 
groups based on the binary variables (such as Senior) and the continuous variables (such 
as Publications Per Filing) divided at the median. Not one of our t-tests resulted in a 
significant difference, suggesting that endogeneity is not a large concern for our lead 
counsel selection test. We next re-estimated the models in Table 5 using an ordered logit 
model with the number of lead plaintiffs as the dependent variable. Unreported, we found 
that the coefficient on Senior was positive and significant at the 10% level, indicating that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys may attempt to take advantage of senior judges by forming larger 
groups of lead plaintiffs (often with a correspondingly larger number of co-lead counsel 
in the lead counsel application). As discussed above, senior judges, nonetheless, are more 
likely to reject such applications compared with other judges. In other words, it is as if 
the lawyers misestimate the level of scrutiny and attention senior judges are likely to 
apply. We also found that the coefficient on Prior Private Practice is negative and 
significant at the 10% level, indicating that plaintiffs’ attorneys may worry about judges 
with Prior Private Practice and adjust to form smaller groups of lead plaintiffs with a 
correspondingly smaller number of co-lead counsel in the lead counsel application. The 
fact that Prior Private Practice was not significantly different from zero in Table 5, 
therefore, could be a result of this adjustment on the part of plaintiffs’ attorney to present 
such judges with less troublesome applications for lead counsel firms. 
In sum, our tests on the lead plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel provide limited 
evidence that higher-ability judges are more willing to scrutinize lead counsel proposals. 
In particular, judges with greater business law experience and general judicial experience 
 
are more likely to dismiss lead counsel motions. While we do not find evidence that 
judges with prior private practice experience are more likely to dismiss lead counsel 
motions, we do find evidence that plaintiffs’ attorneys may adjust their behaviour to 
present such judges less problematic applications for lead counsel. Senior judges, 
contrary to expectation, do not appear to shirk on effort. It may be that senior judges of 
low ability responsibly avoid securities cases (or those cases are not assigned to them), 
leaving those cases to the subset of senior judges with high ability, who are willing to 
retain those cases. It also may be that senior judges, while preferring to avoid securities 
class action cases, work hard on them once they have them (although we do find some 
evidence that plaintiffs’ attorneys may present senior judges with more troublesome 
applications for lead counsel). 
 
5.3. Dismissal Decision
We predict that higher-ability judges will be more likely to dismiss a securities 
class action. To test this hypothesis, we construct an indicator variable, Dismissal, 
defined as equal to 1 if the judge granted a dismissal with prejudice and 0 otherwise. We 
control for various factors that may affect a judge’s decision to approve the lead 
plaintiffs’ choice of lead counsel with a multivariate logit model using Dismissal as the 
dependent variable estimated on case level data..We omit those cases where the 
plaintiffs’ voluntarily dismissed their suit from the model. 
We include the case-level, district judge characteristic variables (the same as in 
Model 1 of Table 4). We include the Case Controls described above to control for the 
strength of the securities class action. Because the law of the specific circuit may affect 
the likelihood of dismissal, we include circuit effects in the model. We also include year 
effects (for the year of the dismissal decision) to control for shifts in the law governing 
how courts deal with dismissals over the time period of our class action dataset from 
2003 to mid-2007. 
 
Dismissali =  + ß1iPublications Per Filingi  
+ ß2iAffirmed Opinionsi + ß3iPositive Citationsi 
+ ß4iTop Schooli.+ ß5iSeniori 
+ ß6iPrior Judgei.+ ß7iJudge Experiencei 
+ ß8iDemocrati + ß9iChief Judgei  
+ Case Controls + Circuit Effects  
+ Year Effects + i 
 
We present the results in Table 6 as Model 1. Higher-ability judges (measured by 
Publications Per Filing and Positive Citations) are more likely to dismiss a case, at a 
statistically significant level. On the other hand, the coefficients on Senior and Affirmed 
Opinions are not significantly different from zero. Once again, the coefficient on 
Affirmed Opinion is negative (in the opposite direction from that predicted). 
Interestingly, we find that Democratic judges are more willing to dismiss cases, contrary 
 

to the view the Republican judges are tougher on securities class action plaintiffs.  
[Table 6 about Here] 
In Model 2 of Table 6 we include our business-specific measures for experience 
(Business Caseload and Prior Private Practice) and remove our general judicial 
experience variables (Prior Judge and Judge Experience). None of these variables are 
significant. The coefficients on Positive Citations and Publications per Filing remain 
positive and significant at the 5% level.23 
Endogeneity is a potential issue with the dismissal decision because plaintiffs’ 
attorneys might rationally anticipate a judge’s ability (and resulting inclination to focus 
on the motion to dismiss) and choose to dismiss voluntarily their case prior to a judicial 
dismissal decision. Because we only test the decision to dismiss on cases that were not 
voluntarily dismissed, we may understate the impact of a judge’s ability on the overall 
rate at which cases are dismissed (whether voluntarily or due to a dismissal with 
prejudice). To determine the importance of voluntary dismissal, we define 
Any_Dismissal as equal to 1 if the judge granted a dismissal with prejudice or the 
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the suit and 0 otherwise. We re-estimated the models in 
Table 6 using Any_Dismissal as the dependent variable. Unreported, we obtained the 
same qualitative results as in Table 6. We thus find that higher-ability judges correlates 
with an increased probability of dismissal—whether the judge makes the actual dismissal 
decision or the plaintiffs’ voluntarily choose to dismiss in anticipation of the judge’s 
likely dismissal decision. 
Our results support the hypothesis that higher-ability judges (the relevant ability 
measures being publications and citations) are more likely to dismiss a case. 
 
5.4. Approval of Settlements and Attorney Fees
The judge plays a key role in evaluating the two-sided agency problem in 
securities cases at multiple points; one of which is when the parties bring the judge a 
settlement agreement for approval. The role of the judge here is to act as the guardian for 
the absent investors and ensure that their agents (the plaintiff’s lawyers and the corporate 
executives) are not misbehaving. We take the willingness to reject settlement agreements 
as a sign of judicial ability. Rejection means more work for the judge.  
We first categorize judicial decisions on motions to accept the first preliminary 
settlement motion. As reported in Table 7, only 8 out of the 215 cases (or 3.2%) with 
judicial decisions on the first preliminary settlement motion resulted in a denial of the 
motion. We then examined judicial decisions on the final settlement motion. 
Unfortunately, we have no variation: none of these decisions resulted in a denial of the 
motion. Accordingly, rather than look at judicial decisions concerning the settlement, we 
                                                 
23 As a robustness test, we combine Prior Judge, Judge Experience, Business Caseload, and Prior Private 
Practice together with our other independent variables in the same model. Unreported, we obtained the 
same qualitative results as in Table 6.  
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examine whether any change takes place to the settlement amount from the date of the 
initial stipulated settlement agreement to the date of the final settlement motion decision. 
Only 8 out of 215 settlements (or 3.7%) had a change in the settlement amount from the 
initial stipulated settlement agreement. Moreover, only 2 of the 215 settlements (or 0.9%) 
resulted in an increase in the settlement amount to the benefit of class members. 
[Table 7 about Here] 
Because of the small number of denials to the preliminary or final settlement 
motion as well as the small number of times the settlement amount actually increased to 
the benefit of class members from the initial stipulated agreement, we are unable to 
estimate a multivariate model to test our hypotheses on district judge characteristics. 
Judges almost always—regardless of their characteristics—accept the settlement 
proposed by the securities class action litigants. 
 Instead of examining the decision to approve a settlement, we therefore focus on 
the related decision by judges to approve the requested fees for the plaintiffs’ attorneys. 
The point of greatest interest to one set of potentially misbehaving agents, the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, is the approval of attorney fees. Higher-ability judges will be more likely to 
scrutinize these attorney fees because they cannot depend on the defense side to do so 
fully (after all, they are paying the fees out of the corporate coffers rather than the 
pockets of the executives). To test this, we focus on the sub-sample of class actions that 
resulted in a settlement. We define an indicator variable Judge Rejected Fee as equal to 1 
if the judge rejected the attorney fee motion without modification and 0 otherwise. To 
control for various factors that may affect the judicial decision on attorney fees, we 
estimate a multivariate logit model on the set of settlements in our dataset with Judge 
Approved Fee as the dependent variable. 
Aside from our case-level judge characteristic and case control independent 
variables, we include the requested attorney fee (Requested Fee). The chance that a judge 
will approve the attorney fee in a securities settlement will decrease as the level of 
requested fee increases. We also include the log of the settlement amount (ln(Settlement 
Amount)). Judges may be more willing to accept the attorney fee request the greater is 
the settlement amount. We do not include Circuit or District effects in the model. We 
have no a priori reason to believe that circuit or district court-specific practices may 
affect a judge’s propensity to accept the plaintiffs’ attorney fee request..We also have no 
reason to believe that the propensity of a judge to accept or reject the fee request varied 
with time and do not include year effects. 
 
Judge Approved Feei =  + ß1iPublications Per Filingi  
+ ß2iAffirmed Opinionsi + ß3iPositive Citationsi 
+ ß4iTop Schooli.+ ß5iSeniori 
+ ß6iPrior Judgei.+ ß7iJudge Experiencei 
+ ß8iDemocrati + ß9iChief Judgei  
+ ß10iRequested Feei + ß11iln(Settlement Amount)i  
+ Case Controls + i 
 
We present the results in Table 8 as Model 1. The Senior variable was dropped 
from Model 1 because Senior judges were perfectly correlated with judges approving the 
attorney fee motion, consistent with the hypothesis that senior judges exert lower effort 
and thus are more likely to accept the attorney fee request. Although we cannot rule out 
the possibility that the litigants have greater familiarity with the preferences of senior 
judges and may adjust their fee awards to match these preferences.  
The coefficient on Affirmed Opinions in Model 1 is negative and significant at 
the 10% level. Once again, contrary to our prediction that higher affirmance rates were a 
proxy for high ability in judging, we find that judges with higher affirmance rates are less 
likely to reject the attorney fee motion without modification. Also contrary to our 
hypothesis, the coefficients on Prior Private Practice and Prior Judge are both negative 
and significant at the 1% level. Note also that the coefficient on Democrat is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. Consistent with the view that Democratic judges are more 
permissive toward plaintiffs’ attorneys, we find that Democratic judges are less likely to 
reject the attorney fee motion without modification. Top School —attending, Harvard, 
Yale or Stanford for law school--is also negative and significant the 1% level. Judges 
who attended a top law school are less likely to reject the attorney fee request without 
modification. 
 [Table 8 about Here] 
In Model 2 of Table 8 we include our business-specific measures for experience 
(Business Caseload and Prior Private Practice) and remove our general judicial 
experience variables (Prior Judge and Judge Experience). As in Model 1, the coefficient 
on Publications Per Filing is not significant. The coefficient on Affirmed Opinions, while 
still negative, is no longer significant. In contrast, the business-specific experience 
variables are consistent with our experience hypothesis. Business Caseload is positive 
and significant at the 10% level; Prior Private Practice is positive and significant at the 
5% level. Judges with prior business-specific experience are more likely to reject the 
attorney fee request.24. 
                                                 
24 As a robustness test, we combine Prior Judge, Judge Experience2002, Business Caseload, and Prior 
Private Practice together with our other independent variables in the same model. Unreported, we obtain 
similar qualitative results as in the models of Table 8. The coefficient on Affirmed Opinions is negative and 
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on Business Caseload, while still positive, is now significant at 
the 17.5% level, beyond conventional statistical significance. 
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Endogeneity is a potential issue with the attorney fee inquiry because lawyers 
might rationally anticipate a judge’s ability (and resulting inclination to focus on the 
attorney fee motion) and shape their fee requests accordingly. As noted above, we shaped 
our inquiry to cover a period of time when the law on securities class actions was in 
considerable flux, which should have made it difficult for lawyers to make predictions 
about how judges would rule on motions. But a critic might argue that the matter of 
attorney fees is independent of the securities laws (instead, largely a function of the effort 
exerted by the lawyers). The point is a fair one. To examine it, we looked to see whether 
the fee requests being made varied as a function of the judge, correcting for case 
characteristics.  
We first compared the requested attorney fee using a series of t-tests for our judge 
characteristics independent variables—separating the settlement judges into two groups 
based on the binary variables (such as Senior) and the continuous variables (such as 
Publications Per Filing) divided at the median. Not one of our t-tests resulted in a 
significant difference, suggesting that endogeneity is not a large concern for attorney fee 
request test..Plaintiffs’ attorneys do not appear to be adjusting their fee award according 
to observable characteristics of the settlement judge. We next re-estimated the models in 
Table 8 using an ordinary least squares model with the log-odds of the requested attorney 
fee as the dependent variable and omitting the requested attorney fee from among the 
independent variables. Unreported, none of our judge characteristic independent variables 
were significantly different from zero, indicating that plaintiffs’ attorneys do not adjust 
their fee application based on the characteristics of the settlement judge. We thus found 
little indication of endogeneity in the attorney fee motion. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The existing literature on judges focuses largely on cases where there are 
published opinions. That poses a particular problem with regards to the district courts 
because the primary task of these judges is to manage cases—ruling on evidentiary 
matters, discovery requests, and preliminary motions—rather than publish opinions (Kim, 
et al., 2009). The recent electronic availability of information on decisions on the various 
intermediate decisions in a case, however, has made fuller inquiry into the behavior of 
district judges possible (Hoffman, et al., 2008; Kim, et al., 2009). Using this data, we 
inquire into the behavior of district judges in securities class actions; an area where the 
judge has a particularly important role to play in policing the two-sided agency problem. 
                                                                                                                                                 
To control for this selection bias, we attempted to re-estimate the models of Table 8 with the 
HECKPROB model in Stata. For an instrument, we used the total number of securities class actions filed in 
the dataset time period for the district court in which the specific class action is filed. We assume this 
variable is correlated with the decision to settle. A particular district court with large numbers of securities 
class action may face greater pressure to dismiss such actions to clear their docket, leading to fewer 
settlements. On the other hand, we assume this variable is not correlated directly with requested attorney 
fees in a particular settled litigation. Unfortunately, the HECKPROB models did not converge to a solution. 
We were therefore unable to control for a possible selection bias.  
 
 It is difficult to summarize our findings, but we can say, roughly, that there is 
suggestive evidence that higher-ability judges produce higher-quality judicial output, in 
the sense of being more willing to make difficult choices in securities litigation cases. A 
number of our measures of ability, such as publication rates, citations, and prior business 
and judicial experience, are positive correlated with one or more of the dependent 
variables that represent more work for the judge. For example, judges with higher 
numbers of published opinions are also more likely to take on securities cases, reject 
proposed lead plaintiffs and to dismiss cases. 
 The major exception is affirmance rate. Judges with higher affirmance rates avoid 
securities class actions and are unlikely to reject attorneys’ fees requests. We offer the 
following speculation to explain these results. Judges’ affirmance rates are a more salient 
aspect of their reputation than publication rates and positive citations. In addition, 
affirmance has a more direct impact on a judges’ workload than publication rates and 
positive citations. A judge who is reversed has more work—she must continue the case 
on remand. A judge who writes fewer or less influential opinions is not penalized in the 
same way. Accordingly, judges have strong incentives to avoid reversals. Judges who 
refrain from dismissing securities class actions will not be reversed—virtually all these 
cases settle and are therefore not appealed. And judges who accept attorneys’ fees 
requests also do not face appeal and the possibility of additional work. 
 If this story is correct, the lower-ability judges—or at least, the more cautious and 
work-averse judges—will deny motions to dismiss and accept fee agreements. These 
lower-ability or more cautious judges are in fact those who end up with higher affirmance 
rates. The story has troubling implications for judicial behavior. For the judges for whom 
an important goal is to avoid reversal, there are strong incentives to permit plaintiffs’ 
lawyers and defendants to collude—because colluding parties don’t appeal when their 
agreements are accepted. 
 Another surprise in the results concerns senior judges. We predicted that taking 
senior status was a sign of diminishing abilities and inclinations to work. We expected, 
therefore, to find that senior judges would do less work on these cases than their younger 
and more energetic colleagues. We do find that senior judges are less likely to take on 
securities class actions and more likely to drop them—and that is consistent with the 
increased leeway that senior judges have in determining their caseloads. However, these 
senior judges, if they are on one of these cases, are more likely to scrutinize the choice of 
lead plaintiffs than their colleagues are. They also do not grant dismissals at a 
significantly higher rate than their junior colleagues. One explanation for these findings is 
that we may have made some incorrect assumptions about what it means to take senior 
status. Instead of that choice being driven by diminished interest and ability, it may have 
more to do with being a good institutional citizen. Congress, in recent years, has been 
slow in authorizing additional federal judgeships to help tackle the fast increasing federal 
caseload. One way to get around this problem is for more of the judges on a court to take 
 
senior status. When they do that, they can continue to try cases (the minimal amount they 
have to take on is 25% of the full load) and the court also gets a new judge. In other 
words, taking senior status may be more of a sign of institutional commitment than 
diminishing ability.25  
The data, then, tell a complex story about the motivations and characters of 
judges. The literature tells us that judges care about political outcomes. Our data suggest, 
in addition, that judges have different dispositions and levels of ability, and these 
differences will show up in measurable patterns of behavior. 
                                                 
25 There is some evidence supporting this view. Yoon (2005) reports that roughly a fourth of judges he 
surveyed reported that the primary reason they took senior status was to help out their courts. Also along 
the lines of senior judges internalizing institutional commitments, Haire (2009) finds that the voting 
patterns of senior judges are less ideological than those of their colleagues.  
 
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Table 1: Summary of Datasets 
Securities Class Action Dataset 
Year of Suit Filing Freq. Percent 
2003 148 26.8 
2004 172 31.2 
2005 138 25.0 
2006 81 14.7 
2007 13 2.4 
Total 552 100.0 
   
Circuit Court Freq. Percent 
1 36 6.5 
2 103 18.7 
3 46 8.3 
4 21 3.8 
5 50 9.1 
6 26 4.7 
7 27 4.9 
8 26 4.7 
9 144 26.1 
10 20 3.6 
11 50 9.1 
D.C. 3 0.5 
Total 552 100.0 
   
Outcome (if Known) Freq. Percent 
Settlement 254 49.9 
Trial Verdict or Judgment  
on Pleadings for Plaintiff 
2 0.4 
Summary Judgment for Defendant 6 1.2 
Voluntary Dismissal 56 11.0 
Dismissal with Prejudice 191 37.5 
Total 509 100.0 
 
 
 
Judge Dataset 
Involvement in Securities Class Action Freq. Percent 
Involved in Securities Class Action 201 32.7 
Not involved in Securities Class Action 414 67.3 
Total 615 100.0 
   
Circuit Court Freq. Percent 
1 28 4.6 
2 69 11.2 
3 51 8.3 
4 51 8.3 
5 70 11.4 
6 62 10.1 
7 49 8.0 
8 42 6.8 
9 89 14.5 
10 35 5.7 
11 57 9.3 
D.C. 12 2.0 
Total 615 100.0 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Independent Variables 
Judge Characteristics 
Variable Mean 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
Positive Citations 1.735 0.710 1.333 2.116 1.925 
Publications Per Filing 0.025 0.005 0.012 0.026 0.035 
Affirmed Opinions 0.915 0.875 0.949 1.000 0.124 
Business Caseload 0.093 0.000 0.056 0.135 0.135 
Prior Private Practice 0.420 0 0 1 0.494 
Prior Judge 0.423 0 0 1 0.494 
Democrat 0.524 0 1 1 0.500 
Senior2005 0.224 0 0 0 0.418 
Judge Experience2002 10.694 5 10 15 6.782 
Top School 0.145 0 0 0 0.352 
 
Case Controls 
Variable Mean 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
Restatement 0.356 0 0 1 0.5 
Gov Investigation 0.429 0 0 1 0.5 
Officer Terminated 0.326 0 0 1 0.5 
Auditor Terminated 0.074 0 0 0 0.3 
Insider Trading Claim 0.588 0 1 1 0.5 
Section 11 Claim 0.115 0 0 0 0.3 
Market Cap ($ millions) 5800.0 150.2 532.5 2000.0 20000.0 
High Tech 0.167 0 0 0 0.373 
 
Table 2 Continued 
 
Other Controls 
Variable Mean 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
Public Pension 0.144 0 0 0 0.324 
Labor Union 0.163 0 0 0 0.335 
Other Institution 0.145 0 0 0 0.308 
Requested Fee 0.269 0.250 0.270 0.300 0.052 
Settlement ($ millions) 23.1 2.8 6.0 13.5 89.1 
  
Dependent Variables 
 
Judge Level Dependent Variables 
Variable Mean 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
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Table 3: Selection of Securities Class Action Judges 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Publications Per Filing 1.639 1.602 
 (0.51) (0.50) 
   
Affirmed Opinions -1.625+ -1.304 
 (-1.74) (-1.42) 
   
Positive Citations 0.0149 0.0145 
 (0.28) (0.27) 
   
Top School 0.405 0.366 
 (1.19) (1.09) 
   
Senior 2005 -0.871* -0.605+ 
 (-2.36) (-1.73) 
   
Prior Judge 0.639**  
 (2.80)  
   
Judge Experience2002 0.0447+  
 (1.77)  
   
Business Caseload  -0.708 
  (-0.81) 
   
Prior Private Practice  -0.258 
  (-1.10) 
   
Democrat -0.176 -0.329 
 (-0.63) (-1.33) 
   
Chief Judge2002-2007 -0.326 -0.223 
 (-1.10) (-0.79) 
   
Constant 0.214 0.853 
 (0.24) (0.97) 
District Court Indicators Yes Yes 
N 404 404 
pseudo R2 0.128 0.112 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Models 1 and 2 are logit models estimated on 
judge-level data with Securities Judge as the dependent variable. District Court Indicators are for districts 
with 20 or more class actions in our dataset and include the Southern District of New York, the Central 
District of California, the District of Massachusetts, the District of New Jersey, the Middle District of 
Florida, the Northern District of California, the Northern District of Texas, the Southern District of 
California, and the Southern District of Florida. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.
 
Table 4: Judge Continues 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Publications Per Filing 18.01 17.16 
 (1.61) (1.52) 
   
Affirmed Opinions -2.000 -0.288 
 (-0.60) (-0.09) 
   
Positive Citations 0.0553 -0.0340 
 (0.33) (-0.20) 
   
Top School -0.654 -0.339 
 (-0.99) (-0.49) 
   
Senior -2.421* -2.577** 
 (-2.40) (-2.63) 
   
Prior Judge -0.141  
 (-0.22)  
   
Judge Experience 0.0228  
 (0.49)  
   
Business Caseload  7.083+ 
  (1.94) 
   
Prior Private Practice  -0.823 
  (-1.23) 
   
Democrat 0.253 -0.258 
 (0.37) (-0.41) 
   
Chief Judge -0.949 -0.206 
 (-0.93) (-0.19) 
   
Constant 7.202* 5.950+ 
 (2.08) (1.82) 
District Court Indicators Yes Yes 
Case Controls Yes Yes 
N 209 209 
pseudo R2 0.246 0.288 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Models 1 and 2 are logit models estimated on 
securities class action case level data with Judge Continues as the dependent variable. Note that Auditor 
Terminated was perfectly correlated with Lead Plaintiff Attorney Choice and was dropped from the logit 
model. District Court Indicators are for districts with 20 or more class actions in our dataset and include the 
Southern District of New York, the Central District of California, the District of Massachusetts, the District 
of New Jersey, the Middle District of Florida, the Northern District of California, the Northern District of 
Texas, the Southern District of California, and the Southern District of Florida. Variable definitions are in 
the Appendix.  
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Table 5: Lead Plaintiff Attorney Rejected 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Publications Per Filing 10.15 12.40+ 
 (1.49) (1.84) 
   
Affirmed Opinions -2.640 -1.885 
 (-0.95) (-0.64) 
   
Positive Citations 0.129 0.0767 
 (0.81) (0.43) 
   
Top School 0.486 0.187 
 (0.79) (0.33) 
   
Senior 2.565** 3.308** 
 (2.68) (3.54) 
   
Prior Judge 0.328  
 (0.57)  
   
Judge Experience 0.0874*  
 (2.02)  
   
Business Caseload  3.976+ 
  (1.65) 
   
Prior Private Practice  0.442 
  (0.81) 
   
Democrat 0.574 0.0393 
 (0.87) (0.06) 
   
Chief Judge 0.324 1.379+ 
 (0.36) (1.70) 
   
Public Pension -1.335 -0.947 
 (-1.25) (-0.94) 
   
Labor Union 0.0155 -0.236 
 (0.02) (-0.28) 
   
Other Institution 0.00322 0.311 
 (0.00) (0.41) 
   
Constant -3.564 -3.154 
 (-1.31) (-1.07) 
Case Controls Yes Yes 
N 267 269 
pseudo R2 0.198 0.221 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Models 1 and 2 are logit models estimated on 
securities class action case level data with Lead Plaintiff Attorney Rejected as the dependent variable 
(rejection of lead plaintiff attorney choice). Note that Auditor Terminated was perfectly correlated with 
Lead Plaintiff Attorney Choice and was dropped from the logit model. Variable definitions are in the 
Appendix.  
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Table 6: Dismissal Decision 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Publications Per Filing 12.48* 12.40* 
 (1.99) (1.98) 
   
Affirmed Opinions -1.419 -1.247 
 (-0.85) (-0.74) 
   
Positive Citations 0.283* 0.269* 
 (2.20) (2.07) 
   
Top School -0.201 -0.264 
 (-0.44) (-0.58) 
   
Senior -0.540 -0.407 
 (-0.57) (-0.43) 
   
Prior Judge -0.0370  
 (-0.10)  
   
Judge Experience 0.0258  
 (0.71)  
   
Business Caseload  -0.874 
  (-0.57) 
   
Prior Private Practice  0.255 
  (0.68) 
   
Democrat 1.027+ 0.856+ 
 (1.80) (1.80) 
   
Chief Judge -0.232 -0.188 
 (-0.35) (-0.28) 
   
Constant -0.348 -0.0231 
 (-0.15) (-0.01) 
Case Controls Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Circuit Effects Yes Yes 
N 218 218 
pseudo R2 0.206 0.207 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Models 1 and 2 are logit models estimated on 
securities class action case level data with Dismissal as the dependent variable. Note that Auditor 
Terminated was perfectly correlated with Lead Plaintiff Attorney Choice and was dropped from the logit 
model. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
 	
Table 7: Settlement Outcomes 
 
 Freq. Percent 
Judge Accepted Final Settlement Motion 241 100.0 
Judge Rejected Final Settlement Motion 0 0.0 
Total 241 100.0 
   
   
Judge Accepted Preliminary Settlement Motion 239 96.8 
Judge Rejected Preliminary Settlement Motion 8 3.2 
Total 215 100.0 
   
   
Settlement Amount Unchanged From Stipulation 207 96.3 
Settlement Amount Changed From Stipulation 8 3.7 
... Settlement Amount Increased 2 0.9 
... Settlement Amount Decreased 6 2.8 
Total 215 100.0 
 
 
Table 8: Judge Rejected Attorney Fee 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Publications Per Filing -28.86 -24.85 
 (-1.53) (-1.57) 
   
Affirmed Opinions -5.509+ -4.115 
 (-1.87) (-1.56) 
   
Positive Citations -0.388 -0.473 
 (-1.14) (-1.45) 
   
Top School -2.959** -3.136* 
 (-2.69) (-2.50) 
   
Prior Judge -3.167**  
 (-3.10)  
   
Judge Experience -0.286**  
 (-2.74)  
   
Business Caseload  5.805+ 
  (1.71) 
   
Prior Private Practice  2.118* 
  (2.43) 
   
Democrat -3.229** -1.476+ 
 (-2.61) (-1.68) 
   
Chief Judge -1.658 -1.502 
 (-1.57) (-1.51) 
   
Log odds of the Requested Fee 5.614* 3.887* 
 (2.48) (2.15) 
   
ln(Settlement Amount) -0.512 -0.329 
 (-1.13) (-0.76) 
   
Constant 15.68** 6.449+ 
 (3.00) (1.93) 
Case Controls Yes Yes 
N 94 94 
pseudo R2 0.394 0.322 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Models 1 and 2 are logit models estimated on 
securities class action case level data with Judge Rejected Attorney Fee as the dependent variable. Case 
Controls include the Restatement, Gov. Investigation, Officer Terminated, Auditor Terminated, Insider 
Trading, Section 11, ln(Market Capitalization) and High Technology variables. Variable definitions are in 
the Appendix. 
 

Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variables 
Variable Description 
Securities Judge Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge made a lead plaintiff 
decision in a securities class action during our case dataset time period and 0 
otherwise. 
Judge Continues Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the first judge listed in the reference 
case docket as given by Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse is the 
same judge that make the lead plaintiff decision and 0 otherwise. 
Lead Plaintiff Atty Rejected Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge rejected the lead plaintiffs’ 
choice of lead counsel without modification and 0 otherwise. 
Dismissal Indicator variable defined equal to 1 if the suit resulted in a dismissal with 
prejudice and 0 otherwise. 
Judge Rejected Fee Indicator variable defined to equal to 1 if the judge rejected the attorney fee 
motion and 0 otherwise. 
Judge Characteristic Independent Variables 
Variable Description 
Publications Per Filing The average number of published opinions in 2001 and 2002 for the judge in 
question as a fraction of the per judge number of filings for the district court 
in which the judge sits. 
Affirmed Opinions The number of affirmed opinions for the judge in question as a fraction of all 
published decisions in 2001 and 2002. 
Positive Citations The average number of positive citations per opinion for the judge in question 
during the 2001 to 2002 period. 
Top School Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question graduated from 
Harvard, Yale, or Stanford Law School and 0 otherwise. 
Senior2005 Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question is a senior 
judge in the year 2005 or earlier. 
Senior Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question is a senior 
judge in the year in question (first suit filed year, lead plaintiff appointment 
year, or outcome year depending on the test) is made and 0 otherwise. 
Prior Judge Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question immediate 
prior provision before appointment was as a magistrate judge or a judge in 
another court system and 0 otherwise. 
Judge Experience2003 Number of years between the year of appointment for the judge in question 
and the year 2003. 
Judge Experience Number of years between the year of appointment for the judge in question 
and the year in question (first suit filed year, lead plaintiff appointment year, 
or outcome year depending on the test) is made. 
 
Business Caseload The fraction of the judge in questions published opinions in 2001 and 2002 
that were on a securities law or other federal business law subject matter. 
Prior Private Practice Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question immediate 
prior provision before appointment was in private practice and 0 otherwise. 
Democrat Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question was appointed 
by a Democrat President and 0 otherwise. 
Chief Judge2003-2007 Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question was the chief 
judge for the district at any time during 2003 to 2007 and 0 otherwise. 
Chief Judge Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question is the chief 
judge for the district in the year in question (first suit filed year, lead plaintiff 
appointment year, or outcome year depending on the test) is made and 0 
otherwise. 
Other Independent Variables 
Case Control Variables Description 
Section 11 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint for a particular class action alleged a 
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 violation and 0 otherwise. 
Govt. Investigation Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated the presence of a SEC or 
other governmental investigation or enforcement action relating to the fraud at 
issue and 0 otherwise. 
Restatement Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated that the company 
announced a restatement covering at least part of the class period and 0 otherwise.
Officer Term. Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated that a top officer of the 
defendant company resigned or was terminated during the class period and 0 
otherwise. 
Auditor Term. Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated that the auditor resigned or 
was terminated during the class period and 0 otherwise. 
Insider Trading Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint alleged insider trading and 0 
otherwise.
Market Capitalization Market value of a company’s common equity (in $ millions) at the end of the 
fiscal year preceding the beginning of the class period. 
Settlement Amount The settlement amount for the class action. 
High Tech Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is in SIC codes 3570-3577 or 7370-7379 
and 0 otherwise
Public Pension The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a specific case that consist of a public pension 
fund. 
Labor Union The fraction of the lead plaintiffs that consist of a labor union. 
Other Institution The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a specific case that are institutions but not public 
pensions or labor unions. 
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